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This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination 
of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies.  While retail investors are typically also 
minority shareholders and therefore perceived in academic literature to have limited influence on 
corporate dividend decisions, casual empiricism suggests the contrary. We hypothesise that 
corporate reputation serves as a device aligning managers’ incentives with retail minority 
shareholder interests, and that the propensity to manage for corporate reputation is positively 
related to the degree of retail shareholder base. We find empirical evidence of managers of 
Australian companies catering to the retail investors’ preference for dividends when setting 
dividend policy, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the proportion of these 
retail shareholders relative to the total shareholder base is high. Our results are robust when 
controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, signalling, agency costs and 
franking credits. 
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The topic of corporate dividend policy and its determinants has been extensively 
discussed in modern corporate finance literature. The irrelevance of dividend policy to firm value 
was proposed in the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1961) where they demonstrated that 
in a world of perfect information, full capital mobility, no taxes and no agency costs, the dividend 
policy of a company should have no impact on its value. However these assumptions rarely hold 
true in the real world and several theories relaxing these assumptions have been put forward to 
explain the dividend puzzle. 
 
The clientele effect of dividend policy recognizes that the existence of taxes and capital 
market imperfections such as transaction costs and differential interest rates in the real world 
prevents individuals from costlessly adjusting their dividend patterns to fit their preferred 
consumption patterns (i.e. dividend clientele) or tax positions (i.e. tax clientele). Investors are 
therefore attracted to different companies that supply them with their desired dividend pattern. 
When the companies change their policies, investors will readjust their stock holdings 
accordingly. According to Modigliani and Miller (1961), matching occurs when firms set their 
payout policies while investors sort based on their preferences for dividends. Empirical evidence 
for the clientele effect has however been mixed. For example, Jun, Gallagher and Partington 
(2006) examined a sample of 49 Australian institutional equity funds and found evidence of the 
existence of the clientele effect, with institutions generally preferring to hold stocks that pay 
dividends and have full tax credits.  Other studies such as Pettit (1977), Scholz (1992), and 
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Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) have also found evidence of the existence of clientele 
effects, while research by Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978), Richardson, Sefcik 
and Thompson (1986), and Abrutyn and Turner (1990) have found little or contrary evidence of 
it. 
 
Early research on the clientele effects has typically either made no assumptions about the 
direction of causality between dividend policy and investor preferences, or has assumed that 
investors are responding to pre-specified firm payout policies. While the empirical results are 
unchanged regardless of the direction of causal relationship, the implications for understanding 
firm policy can be very different. Indeed if clienteles affect share prices, then it can have a 
feedback effect on managerial decisions. Later studies have therefore focused more on exploring 
the clientele effects hypothesis from the perspective of firms adjusting their policies in response 
to the composition of their current investors. This led to a variant of the clientele effect 
hypothesis called the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) which suggested that the 
corporate dividend policy is driven by prevailing investor demand for dividend payers. Managers 
hence cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers, 
and by not paying dividends when investors prefer nonpayers. In their study of firms in 23 
countries over the period of 1996-2004, Ferrisa, Jayaramanb, and Sabherwalc (2009) found 
empirical evidence of catering among companies, particularly ones incorporated in common law 
countries including Australia. 
 
Studies on the catering theory have traditionally focused on the influence of large 
shareholders on dividend policy, particularly institutional investors. There are several reasons 
why managers may want to cater their firms’ dividend policies to maximize the interests of large 
shareholders. Firstly because large shareholders control a large proportion of the voting rights in a 
company, they help to facilitate quick and negotiated control, block sales to potential raiders 
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(Grossman and Hart, 1980) and have more informed voting and better board communication and 
representation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), thus helping to control agency problems. In addition 
because large players are better informed and have better ability to detect firm quality, Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch (2000) have observed that good firms like to signal themselves by attracting 
large shareholders onto their share register. The tendency for managers to cater to large 
shareholders is hence empirically supported by Perez-Gonzalez (2003) who found that the tax 
preferences of large shareholders impacts the payout policy, with payout increasing when 
dividends are less tax-disadvantageous relative to capital gains for firms whose large shareholders 
were less affected by the tax system. 
 
There has however been limited research exploring the role of retail minority shareholder 
demand in shaping firm payout policy, particularly in the market of Australia. Because retail 
investors are typically also minority shareholders, they are therefore perceived in most academic 
literature to have limited influence on corporate decisions, thus leading to little work being done 
in this area. Casual empiricism however suggests that in the real world, retail minority 
shareholder preferences can be an important determinant of corporate policy. For example, 
Charles Goode of major Australian financial institution ANZ Bank, noted in his 2009 Chairman’s 
Report 2  his awareness of how “reducing dividends impacts all shareholders particularly 
individuals”, thus highlighting his consideration of retail shareholder preferences when setting 
dividend policy. 
 
This paper aims to fill part of the gap in academic research by investigating the 
relationship between retail minority shareholder preference and dividend policy. We theorise that 
when making corporate dividend policy decisions, managers of Australian companies are 
                                                 




motivated, through the influence on corporate reputation, to cater to the retail minority investors’ 
preference for dividends, with their incentive to cater positively related to the proportion of retail 
shareholder base 3 . Our pooled Tobit regression results show that the proportion of retail 
shareholders relative to the total number of shareholders is positively related to the dividend 
policy of Australian companies, and that the relation is statistically significant even when 
controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage and signalling. We also show 
that the shareholding ownership is not a significant factor in the setting of dividend policy, thus 
highlighting that our result is not a proxy for the dividend substitution hypothesis. Our empirical 
results are robust to the inclusion of agency costs and franking credits considerations, and robust 
to the adoption of alternative definitions of the control variables. We therefore show that the 
proportion of retail shareholder base is an important determinant of corporate dividend policy in 
Australia. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the effects of retail shareholders 
on corporate reputation and dividend policy, and introduces our hypothesis. Section 3 describes 
the data sample and the methodology pursued. The empirical findings are reported in Section 4, 
while robustness tests are conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Retail Shareholders, Corporate Reputation and Dividend Policy 
 
2.1 Australian Retail Shareholder Preference for Dividends 
 
                                                 
3  Shareholder base is commonly defined as the number of shareholders on the share register while 
shareholding refers to the number of shares of the company. In this paper, the proportion of retail 
shareholder base refers to the number of retail shareholders relative to the total number of shareholders, 
while the proportion of retail shareholdings refers to the number of shares owned by retail shareholders 
relative to the total number of shares outstanding. 
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 While Modigliani and Miller (1961) posits that shareholders should be indifferent to 
dividends versus capital gains, in the real world retail shareholders in Australia generally prefer to 
receive dividends. There are several reasons why this is so: since 1 July 1987, Australia has 
operated a dividend imputation system where stockholders can potentially receive a credit for the 
taxes paid at the corporate level on distributed profits. In essence, stockholders receive a franked 
dividend that comprises of a cash dividend plus an imputation tax credit. This imputation tax 
credit reflects the amount of corporate tax paid on the source profit from which the dividend was 
paid, and can be used to offset Australian personal tax obligations. As shown by Hanson and 
Ziegler (1990), local residents paying taxes are the main beneficiaries of these franked dividend 
payments. Given retail investors are predominantly also local residents 4 , franked dividends 
therefore represent a tax-effective form of income for them. 
 
 In addition, retail investors also prefer to receive dividends because a portion of 
shareholders, particularly retirees, do rely on dividends for their income requirements. This is 
especially significant in Australia which has a rapidly aging population while boasting one of the 
highest rates of individual share ownership in the world. For example, we calculate5 that the 
proportion of direct share owners who are above the legal retirement age of 65 is 20.5% in 2008, 
while the average age of an Australian direct share owner is 50.8 years old. 
 
2.2 Casual Empiricism of Retail Shareholder Base as a Determinant of Dividend Policy 
 
                                                 
4 According to the 2008 ASX Share Ownership Study, of the 35% of Australian population who directly 
invest in shares, 82.9% of them own shares only on ASX while 11.4% of them own shares on ASX and 
overseas, thus leaving 5.7% of them who invest in overseas equity markets only. This tendency to invest 
only in their home country explains why retail investors are predominantly also local residents, and is a 
phenomenon that is also observed in various other international markets including the US. French and 
Poterba (1991) hence term this phenomenon the equity home bias puzzle. 
5 Calculations are performed by combining the figures for the proportion of direct share owners in each age 
group provided by the 2008 ASX Share Ownership Study with data of the number of Australian persons 
within each age group across the population provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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While retail shareholders may have a strong preference for dividends in Australia, they 
are usually also minority shareholders and are therefore assumed in academic literature to have 
limited influence on corporate policies, thus leading to the theory of the “rational apathy” of retail 
shareholders. Casual empiricism however strongly suggests that managers of Australian 
companies are keenly aware of domestic retail investors’ preference for dividends, and are more 
likely to take this preference into account in their dividend decisions when the proportion of retail 
shareholder base is high. For example, Thomas Park, chief executive officer of Australian paper 
company Paperlinx, highlighted in an open briefing6 in 2005 that "when determining the dividend 
payout, [the company] takes into account that 60 percent of [their] shareholders are retail and [. . 
.] are investing for the yield." This consideration is similarly reflected by Richard Goyder, chief 
executive of major Australian diversified company Wesfarmers, in a 2009 interview with 
Australian newspaper The Age7 when he commented on the small likelihood of further dividend 
cuts because Wesfarmers has "got a significant retail shareholder base and are cognisant of their 
desire for [the company] to pay dividends." In his Chairman's Address during the 2002 Annual 
General Meeting8, Kevin McCann of leading Australian intergated energy provider Origin Energy 
also expressed that the proportion of retail shareholder base is a factor in the determination of the 
corporate dividend policy when he pointed out that "many shareholders particularly [the 
company's] large base of retail shareholders, rely on the payment of dividends to meet their 
income requirements." 
 
 It is worth noting that when alluding to the significant retail shareholder bases of their 
companies, Park, Goyder and McCann were referring to the large number of retail shareholders as 
                                                 
6 Available at 
http://www.paperlinx.com.au/cpa/dat/download_file/CEO%20Park%20on%20Business%20Conditions%20
31.03.05.pdf 
7 Available at http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-business/wesfarmers-says-expects-lower-dividend-
20090122-7n08.html 
8 Available at http://www.originenergy.com.au/1774/files/Chairman'sAddress17-10.pdf 
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a proportion of the total number of shareholders, and not to the percentage of retail shareholdings 
as a proportion of the total shareholdings ownership. This point is evident as share registry 
records show that all three companies were substantially held by institutional and large 
shareholders during those respective mentioned times while retail shareholders accounted for 
only minority holdings within the companies despite forming a greater proportion of the 
shareholder base. 
 
2.3 Corporate Reputation As a Device Aligning Managerial Motivation With Retail 
Minority Shareholder Preference 
 
If company management is indeed taking into account the dividend preference of retail 
investors despite their minority shareholdings, then there must exist a mechanism that aligns 
managerial incentives with retail minority shareholder interests. This mechanism may be in the 
form of a strong level of corporate governance that motivates managers to protect the minority 
shareholder interests, or some other mechanism through which retail shareholders can exert their 
influence on managers despite their minority shareholdings.   
 
We note that during Goyder’s interview, he made particular reference to the “potential for 
a backlash from retail investors” in response to his company’s change in dividend policy. This 
suggests that the potential for reputation damage and bad publicity created by angry retail 
investors may be a reason why the preferences of retail minority shareholders are taken into 
consideration by managers when setting dividend policy. This is understandable given the 
importance of corporate reputations to firm values, a conclusion widely supported in academic 
literature. Fombrun (1996) hence defines corporate reputation as “a set of collectively held beliefs 
about a company’s ability and willingness to satisfy the interests of various stakeholders.” 
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Various academic research including Hammond and Slocum (1996), Fombrun (1996), 
and Little and Little (2000) have shown that a good corporate reputation represents a company’s 
most important intangible asset as it allows the company to attract customers to products, charge 
premium prices, attract high quality applicants for its workforce, and attract investors which helps 
to lower its cost of capital. This is particularly important in industries where shareholders are 
frequently also customers. As highlighted by Wilson (2009), “retail investors have trouble 
differentiating their experience. The way they are treated, both in store and as an owner, melds to 
create a hybrid view of the company, its brand and reputation.” He suggests that managers of 
companies should therefore not ignore the preferences of retail investors despite their minority 
shareholdings because of “the damage that can be done to brand and reputation by upsetting these 
shareholders who are also likely to be consumers and some of a company's best ambassadors.” 
Gupta (2002) hence found empirical evidence of firms with favourable corporate reputation 
having a better competitive advantage in terms of customers’ willingness to purchase, willingness 
to pay premium prices, customer satisfaction and customer loyalty, while Nguyen and Leblanc 
(2001) also found that customers are more inclined to buy goods and services from companies 
whom they perceive as having a good reputation. The effectiveness of good corporate reputation 
in enhancing firm profitability is thus empirically supported by Roberts and Dowling (2002) who 
found evidence of the better ability of firms with relatively good reputations to sustain superior 
profit outcomes. In addition, studies by Shefrin and Statman (1995), Srivastava et al. (1997) and 
Larsen (2002) have also found that investors are more willing to ascribe higher share price 
premiums to companies with favourable corporate reputations. 
 
Corporate reputation thus provides the incentive for managers to cater their corporate 
policies to retail minority shareholder preferences. The importance of corporate reputation, and 
therefore the propensity to cater, is observed by Chajet (1997) to be positively correlated to the 
number of shareholders in the company. Chajet (1997) hence commented that “the more 
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stakeholders there are, the more people will be sensitive to the reputations of the companies in 
which they are investing.” The implication is therefore that the higher the retail shareholder base, 
the greater the corporate reputation impact and hence the greater the managerial incentive to cater 
to the retail shareholder preference. 
 
 
2.4 Hypothesis of Retail Shareholder Base, Corporate Reputation and Dividend Policy 
 
We hypothesise in this paper that managers are motivated to cater to the dividend 
preferences of retail investors despite their minority shareholding because of the managers’ desire 
to establish a good corporate reputation which is perceived to then translate into stronger 
profitability for their companies and higher premiums for their share prices. The higher the 
proportion of retail shareholder base, the more sensitive shareholders will be to the company’s 
reputation and hence the greater the motivation for managers to cater to the preferences of these 
retail shareholders. Where retail minority shareholders have a strong preference for dividend 
payments, we should observe that the propensity to pay dividends (i.e. managerial incentive to 
cater to retail minority shareholders) is positively correlated to the degree of retail shareholder 
base (i.e. degree of influence on corporate reputation). We apply our theory to the market of 
Australia where the dividend imputation system, aging population and high equity participation 
has created a strong preference for dividend payments by retail shareholders, and derive a testable 
hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis: The greater the proportion of retail shareholder base, the higher the dividend 
payout of the company. 
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 It is worth highlighting that in our hypothesis, corporate reputation forms the incentive 
for managers to cater to the dividend preferences of retail minority investors. Managers take into 
consideration the dividend preferences of minority shareholders because their numbers make up a 
large proportion of the shareholder base and hence they have greater influence on the corporate 
reputation. This is in contrast to the dividend substitution hypothesis by La Porta et al. (2000) 
where dividends act as a substitute monitoring device for minority shareholders. In that 
hypothesis, managers take into consideration the dividend preference of minority shareholders 
because they want to minimise the agency problems associated with minority shareholdings. The 
difference is therefore that in our hypothesis, it is the proportion of retail shareholder base that is 
important while it is the proportion of retail shareholding (as a proxy of the degree of agency cots) 
which is important in the dividend substitution hypothesis. 
 
 We note that the main object of this paper is to investigate the importance of 
retail minority shareholder base in influencing dividend policy. While we hypothesise that 
corporate reputation serves as the device aligning managerial motivations for dividend policy 
with retail minority shareholder interests, an in-depth investigation into this particular relationship 
is not within the scope of this paper, nor is it critical to our purpose of establishing the importance 
of retail shareholder base as a determinant of dividend policy in Australia. Further research into 
the role of corporate reputation in this linkage, including the relation between corporate 
reputation and the degree of retail shareholder base, is left for the future. 
 
 
3. Data Sample and Methodology 
 
 This section briefly discusses the data sources and the variables’ definitions. The 
dividends data is obtained from Aspect Huntley and Bloomberg, and all other financial data is 
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obtained from Datastream. Shareholding information for the companies in the sample is obtained 
from the annual reports of the companies. The time period employed in this study is the five-year 
period of 2004 to 2008 which represents the time period of available dividends data from Aspect 
Huntley. 
 
Our paper focuses on the large-capitalisation companies in Australia. This is appropriate 
because retail investors in the Australian market have historically invested predominantly in large, 
well-known companies. For example, in the 2006 ASX Share Ownership Survey9, it is found that 
44% of direct investors held shares only in large companies while 50% held shares in a mixture 
of large and small companies. This means that 94% of retail investors held shares in large 
companies. We have hence chosen our sample to comprise of all the Australian companies that 
were in the large-cap focused S&P/ASX 50 Leaders index10 at any point over the time period of 
2004 - 2008. Listed property trusts and stapled securities are however excluded from the sample 
because these vehicles are required by regulation to fully distribute their taxable income as 
dividends to security holders in order to maintain their tax-exempt status 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009). As such, the dividend policies of these companies are more 
likely to be driven by their need to meet regulatory requirements, and their inclusion in the 
sample may distort results. 
 
Our dataset therefore consists of 63 companies over the five-year period of 2004-2008, 
and includes newly-listed companies as well as ones that were taken over and de-listed during the 
study period. This means that the number of observations for each company may not necessarily 
                                                 
9 ASX Share Ownership Studies represent the results of telephone interviews with a sample size of around 
2,000 randomly selected households and individuals within the population. The 2006 study is available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/2006_australian_share_ownership_study.pdf.  The 2006 survey is the 
latest available survey with a breakdown of the size of companies in an average retail portfolio. The 2008 
survey does not provide this statistic. 
10 The S&P/ASX 50 Leaders index comprises of the 50 largest companies by market capitalization that are 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
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be identical. To ensure the maximum number of observations, we construct an unbalanced panel 
dataset using the pooled cross-sectional and time series data available, giving a final sample of 
315 observations. This study includes both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying companies 
so as to avoid the selection bias problem that occurs when non-dividend paying firms are 
excluded. (Kim and Maddala, 1992; Deshmukh, 2003) 
 
  Following the definitions adopted in Lipson, Macquieira and Megginson (1998), 
this paper measures dividend policy as (1) dividends to sales, and (2) dividends to assets.  The 
dividends numerator used to calculate these ratios represent all cash dividends paid by the 
company over the fiscal year, including ordinary dividends, special dividends and return on 
capital. The denominator for the dividends to sales ratio is the net revenues of the company for 
the respective fiscal year, while the denominator for the dividends to assets ratio is the total asset 
value of the company as of fiscal year-end. 
 
In Australia, companies are required to disclose basic details of shareholdings in various 
disclosure bands. There are five disclosure bands: 0–1,000 shares, 1,001–5,000 shares, 5,001-
10,000 shares, 10,001-100,000 shares or greater than 100,000 shares. Companies report the total 
number of investors with a total individual shareholding that falls within each of the bands. The 
2008 ASX Share Ownership Study11 found that the average retail portfolio has a value of AUD 
130,100 consisting of an average of 7 stocks. This means that the average stock holding is about 
AUD 18,586, which equates to around 770 shares assuming the average share price of AUD 
24.17 of the companies in our sample. Taking into consideration that high net worth individuals 
and self-managed super funds are likely to have significantly higher individual holdings, this 
paper therefore defines retail shareholdings as the sum of the two smallest disclosure bands, i.e., 
                                                 
11 The 2008 study is available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/2008_australian_share_ownership_study.pdf. 
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total number of shareholders with individual holdings of 0-1,000 shares and 1,001-5,000 shares. 
The two smallest disclosure bands are more than likely to capture retail holdings. Our definition 
of retail holdings is also consistent with that adopted in Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006). We 
thus derive the proportion of retail shareholder base (Retail shareholder base %) by dividing the 
number of retail shareholders in the two smallest disclosure bands by the total number of 
shareholders. 
 
A number of control factors that have been observed in academic literature to influence 
dividend policy are included in our regression analysis. These control variables are financial 
leverage, size, profitability and signalling. 
 
Financial leverage has been shown to impact dividend policy due to the debt covenants 
and related restrictions imposed by debtholders. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986) have also pointed to the role of leverage in mitigating agency costs arising from 
principal-agent conflicts. We therefore include the ratio of total debt to total assets (Total debt to 
total assets), as a proxy for financial leverage in the regression. A negative relation between 
financial leverage and dividend policy is expected. 
 
The size effect is controlled here through the inclusion of the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization (Market capitalisation). It is often argued that because large companies are typically 
well diversified businesses whose further growth opportunities are already exhausted, they are 
therefore more likely to pay their free cash flows out as dividends than to invest in growth 
opportunities. Ho (2003) hence found empirical evidence of dividend policies being positively 
affected by size in Australia. Smith and Watts (1992) however highlighted that the theoretical 
grounding for the influence of the size effect on dividend policy is not strong. In fact, studies by 
Allen and Michaely (1995) and Keim (1985) have observed a negative relationship between firm 
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size and dividend payout. As such while we include size as a control variable, we do not have any 
particular expectation for its sign. 
 
Profitability is also found in literature to impact dividend policy. Studies by DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) have found that a significant 
proportion of companies having losses over a five-year period tend to omit dividends entirely. 
Jensen, Solbery and Zoun (1992) also find evidence of a positive association between return on 
assets and dividend payouts. We use return on assets (Return on assets) in our paper as a proxy 
for profitability. 
 
Lintner (1956) observed that companies prefer to maintain stable dividends, thus creating 
a persistent pattern over time. This reluctance to cut dividends has been shown by Kalay (1980) 
to be a pre-requisite for the existence of informational content in dividends as hypothesised in 
various dividend signalling theories. A positive relation is therefore expected between a firm’s 
dividend policy and its lagged value. The lagged value of the dividend measure from the previous 
year is hence included as a control variable. To recognise the focus on a progressive dividend 
policy by firm management, the lagged values of dividend policies are calculated as the dividends 
paid in the preceding year divided by the respective denominator in the current fiscal year. 
 
To capture any sector or seasonality effects, we also include dummy variables for the 
financial sector and each fiscal year in our regression. The separation of firms into financial and 
non-financial is standard practice in many areas of corporate finance. This is particularly so in the 
study of dividend policy because dividends are perceived to be more important in the financial 
industry due to its purpose as one of several indicators of financial health. This split of financial 
versus non-financial is therefore supported by the findings of Baker, Dutta and Saadi (2008) who 
surveyed managers of Canadian firms and discovered that the perceptions of the factors 
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influencing dividend policy differ between managers of financial and non-financial companies. 
The separation between financial and non-financial companies is also apt for our hypothesis on 
corporate reputation. This is because corporate reputation is comparatively more important for 
service industries, particularly banks, than for other industrial sectors. Bloemer and de Ruyter 
(1998) and Martensen et al . (2000) have thus focused much of their work on the influence of 
corporate image on customer satisfaction and loyalty in retail banking. 
  
 Because the measures of dividend policy can never be negative, using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression for analysis will be inappropriate due to the truncated nature of the dependent 
variables. This paper therefore employs pooled Tobit estimation, as supported by Kim and 
Maddala (1992), Anderson (1986), Huang (2001), Kouki (2009), Kowalewski, Stetsyuk and 
Talavera (2007), Dahlquist, Robertsson and Rydqvist (2006) and Bebczuk (2007), to examine the 
relationship between dividend policy and the proportion of retail shareholder base. The Tobit 
model is expressed as: 
Div*it  =  β0 + β1 (Retail shareholder base %)it  
+ β2 Divit-1 + β3 (Market capitalisation)it  
+ β4 (Return on assets)it + β5 (Total debt to total assets)it  
2008 
Σ + β6 (Dummy financials sector) + 
t=2004
βj (Dummy t)  
+ εit 
(1) 
where Div*it is the latent dividend variable 
β is the regression coefficient,  
 i is the ith firm in the sample, 
 t is the fiscal year of the firm, 
 ε is the error term and assumed to be iid N(0,σ2), and 
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the observed dividend variable, Divit, is defined as 
   Divit  = 0   if Div*it ≤ 0, and 
    = Div*it   if Div*it > 0 
 
The treatment of all the data follows the convention employed in Fama and French (2001) 
of assigning financial data to years based on the calendar year in which the fiscal year-end falls. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics 12  of the various dividend measures and the 
explanatory variables while Table 2 shows the correlation matrix between these variables. Figures 
1 to 5 show the time series plots of the two dividend measures and the explanatory variables over 
the five-year period of period of 2004 to 2008 for interested readers. 
 
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results of the pooled Tobit13 regression of dividends to 
sales against the proportion of retail shareholder base and the control variables, while Column 1 
of Table 4 shows the pooled Tobit regression of dividends to assets against the same explanatory 
vairables. Our findings show that as consistent with casual empiricism, the proportion of retail 
                                                 
12 Readers will note the large maximum dividends to sales number of 70.583 and large maximum lagged 
dividends to sales number of 63.599. Both these numbers relate to the company Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) whose dividends to sales numbers have been consistently high for the entire period of 2004-2008. 
These are caused by the company’s substantial net non-operating gains which are not included in the sales 
figures under conventional accounting definitions but on which management had paid out dividends. When 
the company is excluded from the sample, the mean and maximum values of both the dividends to sales 
variable and the lagged dividends to sales variables falls to 6.988 and 35.335, and 5.919 and 28.402 
respectively. 
13 We have also performed Tobit regressions on both a winsorised data sample as well as a data sample that 
excludes outlier ASX, and have found both results to be very similar to the results of the Tobit regressions 
run on an unwinsorised data sample with no outlier-exclusions. We have therefore chosen to show the 
results of the Tobit regressions run on the unwinsorised data with no outlier-exclusions in this study. 
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shareholders on the share register of companies is a statistically significant determinant of 
dividend policy, with significance levels of 5% and 1% for dividends to sales and dividends to 
assets respectively. 
 
In addition, the lagged dividend measures are also significant at 1% level for both 
dividend measures. The positive regression coefficients also support Lintner’s sticky dividends 
observation. Return on assets is positively related at 1% significance levels for both dividend 
measures, thus highlighting the importance of profitability as a factor driving dividend policy. 
Size, as represented by market capitalisation, is not significant for both dividend measures while 
financial leverage, represented by total debt to total assets, is negatively related as hypothesised 
by theory and significant at 5% level for dividends to assets but not significant for dividends to 
sales. 
 
Our empirical findings therefore support a form of catering theory where managers’ 
dividend policy decision is influenced by the proportion of retail shareholder base, with firms 
more likely to pay higher dividends when the proportion of retail shareholders relative to the total 
shareholder base is high, even if the proportion of retail shareholdings is minor. 
 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
5.1 Alternative Control Variables 
 
While our chosen variables of market capitalisation, return on assets and total debt to 
total assets are commonly accepted measures of the control factors of size, profitability and 
financial leverage respectively, we want to check that our empirical finding is robust to 
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alternative definitions of the control variables. We therefore adopt different measures of these 
factors, and these alternative measures are: total assets (expressed as a natural logarithm), return 
on invested capital and long-term debt to equity14. 
 
Column 2 of both Table 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions of 
dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base and the 
alternatively defined control variables. The results show that the proportion of retail shareholder 
base continues to be a positive determinant at 5% and 1% significance levels for dividends to 
sales and dividends to assets respectively. The respective lagged dividend measures and the 
alternative profitability measure, return on invested capital, are also significant at 1% levels and 
bear the expected positive signs. Size, as represented by the natural logarithm of total assets, is 
significant at 5% level for dividends to assets but is not significant for dividends to sales, while 
financial leverage as represented by long-term debt to equity is not significant for both measures 
of dividends. 
 
5.2 Ownership and Control 
 
The incentive for management to cater their dividend policy to the preferences of large 
shareholders is commonly highlighted in academic research (Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000; 
Perez-Gonzalez, 2003). It is therefore conceivable that the influence of the large proportion of 
retail shareholder base is in reality exacted through the substantial combined holdings of these 
retail investors and that the common assumption that retail shareholders are also minority 
shareholders does not hold true in Australia. An examination of our data shows that for the firms 
in our sample, on average the percentage of retail investors as a proportion of the total number of 
                                                 
14 The equity measure used in the calculation of the long-term debt to equity refers to common equity 
which is defined here as the common shareholders’ investment in a company, and includes common stock 
value, retained earnings and capital surplus. 
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shareholders is 88.4% while they control only a minority stake of 16.2% of the company’s total 
shareholding ownership. While this suggests that it is unlikely that managers of these Australian 
companies are catering to the retail shareholders’ preference for dividends because these retail 
shareholders are able to influence the decisions through their substantial holdings of the company, 
we have nevertheless chosen to test for the importance of retail shareholding as a determinant. In 
addition, even though we will be investigating the effects of agency costs in more depth in the 
next section, we want to check that the importance of the retail shareholder base is not a proxy for 
the dividend substitution effect arising from its minority shareholdings. We therefore replace the 
proportion of retail shareholder base with the percentage of the company’s shareholdings that is 
held by those retail investors as one of the explanatory variables. 
 
 Column 3 of both Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions. It can 
be seen that the percentage of retail shareholding is not a significant determinant of dividends to 
sales or dividends to assets. This means that the proportion of shareholder base is more important 
than the proportion of shareholdings i.e. when managers cater to the preferences of retail 
shareholders in their dividend decision, they do so not because these retail investors are large 
shareholders, but because they represent a large proportion of the shareholder base. The lack of 
significance of retail shareholding also does not support the argument by Johnson and Shleifer 
(2004) that firms pay higher dividends as a means to establish a reputation of adequate treatment 
of minority shareholders. This implies that dividends are not used as a substitute monitoring 
device by Australian minority shareholders as hypothesised by La Porta et al. (2000). 
 
5.3 Agency Costs and Corporate Governance 
 
The interaction between agency costs and dividend policy was introduced by Rozeff 
(1982) who hypothesised that dividend policy is a function of agency effects in addition to the 
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traditional variables. His basic tenet is that the payment of cash dividends reduces the cash 
available for reinvestment by companies, and therefore forces them to turn to capital markets 
more frequently This places the firms under closer scrutiny by market capital participants when 
new securities are offered, and ensures that managers make decisions in shareholders’ interests. 
Rozeff (1982) hence captures these agency effects through two measures: insider ownership and 
the number of shareholders. Where insiders hold a large percent of the company, they are in a 
position to know the true condition of the company, and therefore external monitoring is 
unnecessary. Conversely where the dispersion of shareholders is wide, the cost of monitoring 
management becomes too large for a single owner to bear. Consequently these dispersed owners 
are more likely to engage the monitoring mechanism of capital markets by forcing payment of 
higher dividends. Rozeff (1982) therefore hypothesised a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and dividend policy, and a positive relationship between the number of shareholders 
and dividend policy. 
 
An alternative aspect of the agency cost theory of dividend policy is put forward by 
Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow theory where he suggested that managers make decisions that 
enhance their own interests which may not necessarily be aligned to shareholders, such as 
overinvesting to enlarge the size of their firms beyond the optimal points given their 
compensations are often related to firm sizes. The payment of dividends therefore helps to 
mitigate these problems by reducing the cash flow under management control. 
 
To capture the degree of agency costs, Holder, Langrehr, and Hexter (1998) therefore 
adopted three measures, namely free cash flow to assets, the proportion of closely-held shares and 
the number of shareholders. We have chosen to test the robustness of our results by including 
agency costs measures as one of our explanatory variables. Indeed, the correlation of 26.1% 
between the total number of shareholders and the respective proportion of retail shareholder base 
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for the companies in our sample is positive and has a statistically significant t-statistic of 4.51. 
This raises the possibility that our chosen explanatory variable of proportion of retail shareholder 
base is only approximating for the degree of agency costs in the company. We hence perform 
further robustness checks using three measures of agency costs: the free cash flow to assets, the 
proportion of closely-held shares and the natural logarithm of the total number of shareholders. 
 
Column 4 of Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions between the 
dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base, the 
control variables and the first agency costs measure of free cash flow to assets. The proportion of 
retail shareholder base is significant at 5% and 1% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to 
assets respectively, and is positively related to both dividend measures. The respective lagged 
dividend measures are also significant at 1% levels for both dividend variables while total debt to 
total assets is significant at 10% and 5% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets 
respectively. Market capitalisation is not significant for both measures. Free cash flow to assets is 
significant at 5% level and is positively related to dividends to sales as hypothesised by Jensen’s 
free cash flow theory although it is not significant for dividends to assets. 
 
Column 5 of both Table 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions 
between dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder 
base, the control variables and the second measure of agency cost which is the proportion of 
closely-held shares. The proportion of retail shareholder base continues to be significant at 5% 
and 1% levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively and is positively related, 
while the proportion of closely held shares is not significant for both dividend measures. 
 
Column 6 of Tables 3 and 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions between the 
dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholder base, the 
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control variables and the third measure of agency cost which is the logarithm of the number of 
shareholders. The results show that the proportion of retail shareholders continue to be a 
significant determinant of dividend policy at 5% and 1% levels for dividends to sales and 
dividends to assets respectively. The number of shareholders is also significant at 1% and 5% 
levels for dividends to sales and dividends to assets respectively. While the negative relation 
between the number of shareholders to both dividend measures runs contrary to the expectations 
of Rozeff (1982), it does provide support for the dividend outcome hypothesis of agency cost 
versus the competing dividend substitution hypothesis. La Porta et al. (2000) similarly found 
empirical support for the outcome model versus the substitute model in their study of the 
dividend policies of companies in 33 countries including Australia, while Lin (2002) found 
empirical evidence that is consistent with the outcome model in his study focusing on the 
dividend policies of companies operating in the 11 Asian-Pacific countries including Australia. 
 
Our empirical results therefore show that the proportion of retail shareholder base is a 
major determinant of dividend policy even when agency cost is taken into consideration. 
 
5.4 Franking Credits 
 
As highlighted earlier, Hanson and Ziegler (1990) have shown that local residents paying 
taxes prefer the payment of dividends under an Australian dividend imputation system. This 
means that both Australian retail and institutional investors prefer higher dividend payouts. 
Empirical evidence is generally supportive of the investor preference for the transfer of these 
imputation credits by companies to them via dividend payments (Jun, Gallagher and Partington, 
2006; Chan, McColough and Skully, 1992). The level of franking credits available for companies 
may therefore also be a major influence of corporate dividend policy in Australia. Bellamy (1994), 
for instance, found the development of shareholder clienteles in response to the introduction of 
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the dividend imputation into the Australian capital markets, with companies paying franked 
dividends significantly increasing their dividend payments relative to companies paying little or 
not imputation tax credits. Pattenden and Twite (2008) similarly observed that all dividend payout 
measures and dividend reinvestment plans increased with the introduction of imputation taxation 
system in Australia. If retail shareholders are simply responding to the amount of franked 
dividends that companies are paying, then the proportion of retail shareholder base may be only a 
proxy for the amount of franking credits available to be paid out by companies. We have 
therefore included the proportion of franked dividends paid by companies as an additional 
explanatory variable of dividend policy. 
 
Column 7 of both Table 3 and Table 4 shows the results of the pooled Tobit regressions of 
dividends to sales and dividends to assets against the proportion of retail shareholders, the control 
variables and the proportion of franked dividends. The results show that as hypothesised, under a 
dividend imputation system, the proportion of franked dividends paid by companies is an 
important determinant of dividend policy at 1% and 5% significance levels for dividends to sales 
and dividends to assets respectively, with the positive regression coefficient reflecting the finding 
of Bellamy (1994) that companies with franking credits pay higher dividends. However, the 
proportion of retail shareholder base continues to be an important factor influencing dividend 
policy, with significance level at the 1% level for both dividend measures. This highlights that the 
proportion of retail shareholder base is a strong determinant of dividend policy even after 
controlling for the amount of distributable franking credits available to companies. 
 
 Our robustness checks have therefore confirmed that our earlier finding of the proportion 
of retail shareholder base as a major determinant of dividend policy holds even when we employ 
alternative measures of the control variables, and when additional considerations such as agency 





This paper investigates the influence of retail minority shareholders in the determination 
of corporate dividend policies of Australian companies.  There has been traditionally been little 
research done on the influence of retail shareholders on dividend policy as retail investors are 
typically also minority shareholders and therefore perceived to have limited influence on 
corporate decisions in most academic literature. Casual empiricism however suggests the 
contrary. 
 
We hypothesise in this paper that corporate reputation serves as a device aligning 
managers’ incentives with retail minority shareholder interests, and that the incentive to manage 
for corporate reputation is strong when the retail shareholder base is high. Our hypothesis 
therefore predicts that managers of companies are influenced by the retail investors’ preference 
for dividends in their payout decision, even when they are minority shareholders, so long as the 
proportion of the retail shareholder base is high.  
 
Our hypothesis is tested in the market of Australia where we find evidence of the retail 
minority shareholder base being an important determinant of corporate dividend policy. Our 
results are robust when controlled for the factors of size, profitability, financial leverage, 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
    Observations Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Dividend measures           
  Dividends to sales 243 7.887 8.115 70.583 0.000 
  Dividends to assets 260 4.506 4.704 29.455 0.000 
Explanatory variables           
  Lagged dividends to sales 243 6.809 6.964 63.599 0.000 
  Lagged dividends to assets 260 3.912 4.358 28.541 0.000 
  Retail shareholder base % 260 87.927 10.807 99.698 39.398 
  Market capitalisation 260 15.955 1.051 19.309 11.057 
  Assets 260 16.066 1.667 20.299 9.743 
  Return on assets 260 8.487 10.635 52.840 -65.740 
  Return on invested capital 260 12.807 14.244 65.300 -88.260 
  Total debts to total assets 260 25.486 15.534 165.290 0.000 
  Long-term debts to equity 260 105.150 170.327 1119.670 0.000 
  Dummy 2005 260 0.200 0.401 1.000 0.000 
  Dummy 2006 260 0.200 0.401 1.000 0.000 
  Dummy 2007 260 0.212 0.409 1.000 0.000 
  Dummy 2008 260 0.196 0.398 1.000 0.000 
  Dummy Financials 260 0.231 0.422 1.000 0.000 
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Div to sales 1.000 0.526*** 0.873*** 0.401*** 0.101 0.109* 0.033 0.205*** 0.262*** -0.182 -0.013 -0.036 -0.003 0.071 0.030 0.237*** 
Div to 
assets 0.526*** 1.000 0.424*** 0.791*** 0.044 -0.106 -0.395 0.523*** 0.495*** -0.136 -0.296 0.040 0.020 0.005 -0.036 -0.228 
Lagged div 
to sales 0.873*** 0.424*** 1.000 0.550*** 0.076 0.089 0.046 0.116* 0.165*** -0.139 0.012 -0.064 -0.010 0.061 0.075 0.222*** 
Lagged div 
to assets 0.401*** 0.791*** 0.550*** 1.000 0.030 -0.131 -0.368 0.393*** 0.360*** -0.071 -0.256 -0.009 0.023 0.021 -0.001 -0.220 
Retail 
s/hldr base 
% 0.101 0.044 0.076 0.030 1.000 0.369*** 0.311*** -0.037 0.054 -0.032 0.202*** -0.024 0.006 0.045 0.007 0.324*** 
Market cap 0.109* -0.106 0.089 -0.131 0.369*** 1.000 0.811*** -0.017 0.056 0.154** 0.349*** -0.076 -0.014 0.162** 0.067 0.340*** 
Assets 0.033 -0.395 0.046 -0.368 0.311*** 0.811*** 1.000 -0.260 -0.176 0.071 0.557*** -0.066 -0.021 0.058 0.109* 0.604*** 
Return on 
assets 0.205*** 0.523*** 0.116* 0.393*** -0.037 -0.017 -0.260 1.000 0.937*** -0.284 -0.162 0.034 0.028 0.091 -0.179 -0.197 
Return on 
invested 
capital 0.262*** 0.495*** 0.165*** 0.360*** 0.054 0.056 -0.176 0.937*** 1.000 -0.308 -0.124 0.033 0.013 0.111* -0.170 -0.066 
Total debts 
to total 
assets -0.182 -0.136 -0.139 -0.071 -0.032 0.154** 0.071 -0.284 -0.308 1.000 0.327*** -0.037 0.034 0.040 0.073 -0.209 
Long-term 
debts to 
equity -0.013 -0.296 0.012 -0.256 0.202*** 0.349*** 0.557*** -0.162 -0.124 0.327*** 1.000 -0.082 0.109* 0.079 0.012 0.486*** 
Dummy 
2005 -0.036 0.040 -0.064 -0.009 -0.024 -0.076 -0.066 0.034 0.033 -0.037 -0.082 1.000 -0.250 -0.259 -0.247 0.000 
Dummy 
2006 -0.003 0.020 -0.010 0.023 0.006 -0.014 -0.021 0.028 0.013 0.034 0.109* -0.250 1.000 -0.259 -0.247 0.000 
Dummy 
2007 0.071 0.005 0.061 0.021 0.045 0.162** 0.058 0.091 0.111* 0.040 0.079 -0.259 -0.259 1.000 -0.256 0.007 
Dummy 
2008 0.030 -0.036 0.075 -0.001 0.007 0.067 0.109* -0.179 -0.170 0.073 0.012 -0.247 -0.247 -0.256 1.000 0.005 
Dummy 
financials 
sector 0.237*** -0.228 0.222*** -0.220 0.324*** 0.340*** 0.604*** -0.197 -0.066 -0.209 0.486*** 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.005 1.000 
Note: Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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Dividends to sales Dividends to assets (rhs)
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Total debt to total assets Long-term debt to equity (rhs)
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Table 3: Pooled Tobit Regression of Dividend to Sales Against Proportion of Retail Shareholder Base, 
Control Variables and Robustness Test Variables, 2004 - 2008 
    Column 
    ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) 
Dependent variable Dividends to sales 
Explanatory variables               
  Retail shareholder base % 0.041** 0.042** - 0.046** 0.042** 0.046** 0.051*** 
    (2.082) (2.203) - (2.455) (2.256) (2.532) (2.613) 
  Lagged dividend measure 0.993*** 0.989*** 0.996*** 0.986*** 0.997*** 0.995*** 0.927*** 
    (26.243) (25.978) (23.408) (26.311) (25.828) (26.504) (23.134) 
  Market capitalisation 0.185 - 0.230* 0.096 0.204* 0.54*** -0.015 
    (1.629) - (1.671) (0.871) (1.881) (4.752) (-0.125) 
  Return on assets 0.100*** - 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.099*** 0.088*** 0.148*** 
    (3.72) - (2.796) (3.249) (3.673) (3.301) (4.681) 
  Total debt to total assets -0.031 - -0.031 -0.037* -0.031 -0.035* -0.036* 
    (-1.479) - (-1.296) (-1.743) (-1.476) (-1.686) (-1.676) 
  Assets - 0.056 - - - - - 
    - (0.525) - - - - - 
  Return on invested capital - 0.076*** - - - - - 
    - (4.136) - - - - - 
  Long-term debt to equity - -0.002 - - - - - 
    - (-1.352) - - - - - 
  Retail ownership % - - -0.010 - - - - 
    - - (-0.315) - - - - 
  Free cashflow to assets - -   3.038** - - - 
    - -   (2.521) - - - 
  Closely-held shares - -   - 0.006 - - 
    - -   - (0.468) - - 
  No. of shareholders - -   - - -0.468*** - 
    - -   - - (-3.177) - 
  Franking % - -   - - - 0.025*** 
    - -   - - - (3.194) 
  Dummy 2005 0.406 0.373 1.063 0.402 0.403 0.351 0.323 
    (0.517) (0.477) (1.12) (0.518) (0.513) (0.453) (0.417) 
  Dummy 2006 0.248 0.37 0.700 0.273 0.287 0.15 0.358 
    (0.315) (0.467) (0.738) (0.349) (0.361) (0.192) (0.458) 
  Dummy 2007 0.301 0.354 0.706 0.341 0.297 0.109 0.537 
    (0.382) (0.449) (0.755) (0.435) (0.374) (0.139) (0.686) 
  Dummy 2008 -0.009 0.011 0.231 0.09 -0.009 -0.139 0.14 
    (-0.011) (0.014) (0.24) (0.112) (-0.011) (-0.172) (0.174) 
  Dummy financials sector 0.922 1.319* 1.301* 1.18* 0.905 0.951 1.411** 
    (1.411) (1.849) (1.689) (1.807) (1.37) (1.454) (2.139) 
  Constant -6.076*** -4.856*** -3.300 -4.864*** -6.649*** -6.598*** -5.933*** 
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    (-3.463) (-2.851) (-1.591) (-2.869) (-3.899) (-3.933) (-3.296) 
                  
Observations 243 243 196 243 241 243 241 
Pseudo R-squared 0.782 0.784 0.790 0.787 0.782 0.786 0.794 






Table 4: Pooled Tobit Regression of Dividend to Assets Against Proportion of Retail Shareholder 
Base, Control Variables and Robustness Test Variables, 2004 - 2008 
    Column 
    ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) 
Dependent variable Dividends to assets 
Explanatory variables               
  Retail shareholder base % 0.032*** 0.030*** - 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
    (2.819) (2.755) - (2.92) (2.947) (3.137) (3.012) 
  Lagged dividend measure 0.736*** 0.727*** 0.761*** 0.737*** 0.739*** 0.738*** 0.677*** 
    (17.211) (16.83) (16.323) (17.244) (17.032) (17.308) (16.039) 
  Market capitalisation 0.042 - 0.043 0.012 0.061 0.196*** -0.075 
    (0.609) - (0.527) (0.171) (0.897) (2.787) (-1.104) 
  Return on assets 0.125*** - 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.18*** 
    (6.517) - (5.06) (6.233) (6.445) (6.277) (8.244) 
  Total debt to total assets -0.03** - -0.027* -0.031** -0.03** -0.032** -0.026** 
    (-2.228) - (-1.796) (-2.323) (-2.22) (-2.389) (-2.017) 
  Assets - -0.161** - - - - - 
    - (-2.446) - - - - - 
  Return on invested capital - 0.085*** - - - - - 
    - (6.453) - - - - - 
  Long-term debt to equity - -0.002 - - - - - 
    - (-1.499) - - - - - 
  Retail ownership % - - -0.001 - - - - 
    - - (-0.051) - - - - 
  Free cashflow to assets - - - 1.078 - - - 
    - - - (1.334) - - - 
  Closely-held shares - - - - 0.003 - - 
    - - - - (0.425) - - 
  No. of shareholders - - - - - -0.203** - 
    - - - - - (-2.142) - 
  Franking % - - - - - - 0.012** 
    - - - - - - (2.534) 
  Dummy 2005 0.496 0.441 1.023* 0.493 0.491 0.472 0.441 
    (0.954) (0.847) (1.701) (0.952) (0.944) (0.917) (0.88) 
  Dummy 2006 0.203 0.258 0.467 0.203 0.232 0.163 0.218 
    (0.387) (0.487) (0.775) (0.387) (0.439) (0.313) (0.431) 
  Dummy 2007 -0.114 -0.103 0.145 -0.102 -0.116 -0.197 -0.094 
    (-0.219) (-0.197) (0.247) (-0.196) (-0.222) (-0.379) (-0.185) 
  Dummy 2008 0.241 0.281 0.437 0.26 0.256 0.199 0.18 
    (0.453) (0.527) (0.726) (0.489) (0.477) (0.375) (0.35) 
  Dummy financials sector -0.620 -0.096 -0.335 -0.53 -0.625 -0.596 -0.405 
    (-1.412) (-0.203) (-0.677) (-1.194) (-1.391) (-1.342) (-0.947) 
  Constant -2.298** 0.467 0.169 -1.756* -2.717*** -2.529** -1.978* 
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    (-2.168) (0.453) (0.135) (-1.717) (-2.61) (-2.421) (-1.921) 
                  
Observations 260 260 213 260 258 260 258 
Pseudo R-squared 0.705 0.702 0.710 0.706 0.705 0.707 0.734 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.s 
 
